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ABSTRACT
Our article revisits the Okun relationship between observed unemployment rates and output
gaps. We include in the relationship the effect of labour market institutions as well as age and
gender effects. Our empirical analysis is based on 20 OECD countries over the period 1985–2013.
We find that the share of temporary workers (which includes a high and rising share of young
workers) played a crucial role in explaining changes in the Okun coefficient (the impact of the
output gap on the unemployment rate) over time. The Okun coefficient is not only different for
young, prime-age and older workers but also it decreases with age. From a policy perspective, it
follows that an increase in economic growth will not only have the desired outcome of reducing
the overall unemployment rate but it will also have the distributional effect of lowering youth
unemployment.
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I. Introduction
Fluctuations in unemployment and growth go hand
in hand and there are numerous empirical studies of
the relationship between the two. The simplest and
most widely cited relationship is ‘Okun’s law’, i.e. the
relationship between unemployment and the cyclical
component of GDP. It is a reduced-form relation-
ship that has underpinned numerous academic and
policy discussions about growth and employment.1
Recent papers suggest that the nature of the rela-
tionship has changed over time and that it is also
different during expansions and during recessions.
For example, Owyang and Sekhposyan (2012) using
quarterly data over the period 1949–2011 estimated
various specifications of the Okun relationship and
found that during the three most recent US reces-
sions and the Great Recession, the unemployment
rate was more sensitive to output growth and output
gap fluctuations. Cazes, Verick and Al Hussami
(2013) analysed country-specific changes in unem-
ployment in the Great Recession and found that
Okun’s relationship varied across countries and
time. In some countries, unemployment was more
responsive and in other countries, it was less respon-
sive to negative economic growth shocks.
Okun (1962) examined three models including a
‘difference version’ which relates the change in the
unemployment rate to the GDP growth rate and a
‘gap version’ which relates the unemployment rate to
the output gap. There is by now an extensive litera-
ture covering both versions. We will be adopting the
‘gap version’ in keeping with our intention of exam-
ining the impact on unemployment of deviations
from potential output.2 Also we will incorporate
into the Okun relationship labour market institu-
tions meaning by that ‘the system of laws, norms,
or conventions resulting from a collective choice and
providing constraints or incentives that alter indivi-
dual choices over labour and pay’ (Boeri and van
Ours (2013), 8).
We revisit Okun’s relationship using data from 20
OECD countries over the period 1985–2013. The aim
of our article is to study the Okun relationship for a
range of countries covering a sample period that
CONTACT Jan C. van Ours janvanours@gmail.com
1Okun specified an empirical relationship without clear indications of causality. Perman and Stephan (2015) present a meta-analysis of 269 estimates of the
Okun relationship from 28 studies. According to their overview, about 60% of all estimates have real output as the left-hand-side variable, about 75% use
country level data and slightly more than half of the studies use a static model.
2The regression equation in Okun (1962) is u ¼ aþ bðgapÞ. One of the criteria Okun used for judging the validity of his estimates is that the results should
agree ‘with the principle that potential GNP should equal actual GNP when u = 4’, this is because he believed the target rate of unemployment (or full
employment rate of unemployment) was 4%.
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includes the Great Recession. In this regard, we will
test for asymmetries in the relationship between the
output gap and the unemployment rate, specifically
whether the Okun coefficient is different in boom and
bust periods. Furthermore, we will examine whether
and by how much the Okun coefficient has changed
over time, especially post the Great Recession.
We offer three contributions to the literature.
First, we investigate how the relationship between
the (equilibrium) unemployment rate, the output
gap and labour market institutions differs depending
upon age and gender. This is an important extension
as the determinants of the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate and the size of the Okun coefficient are
likely to vary across age groups and across gender.
Second, we allow labour market institutions to influ-
ence both the equilibrium rate of unemployment and
the effect of the change in the output gap on the
unemployment gap (i.e. the Okun coefficient).
Third, we provide estimates of time-varying coun-
try-specific equilibrium unemployment rates and
explore differences in the apparent trends in the
equilibrium unemployment rates between countries
(especially those in the Eurozone).
The analysis at the age–gender level, taken in
conjunction with findings about labour-institutional
factors, allows us to draw some policy implications.
We show that equilibrium unemployment rates are
positively related to union density, the unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) replacement rate and the tax
wedge and negatively related to the level of wage
coordination and the terms of trade. We also find
that the effects of changes in the output gap on the
unemployment rate decreases with age. From this,
we infer that an increase in economic growth will
not only reduce the overall unemployment rate but it
will also bring about a more than proportional
decline in the youth unemployment rate.
Our article is structured as follows. In Section II,
we provide a short overview of previous studies and
a description of our empirical model. We also pre-
sent the parameter estimates of Okun’s relationship
assuming to begin with that each country has a
constant equilibrium unemployment rate. In
Section III, we extend our analysis by allowing
labour market institutional factors to affect the equi-
librium unemployment rate while the effect of the
output gap on the unemployment rate is allowed to
depend on the share of temporary workers in
employment. Section IV presents estimates of the
Okun relationship disaggregated by age and gender.
Section V concludes.
II. Okun’s relationship at the country level
Previous studies
Nickell and Layard (1999), Bertola (1999), Nickell
(1997), Siebert (1997), Arpaia and Mourre (2005),
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) and Boeri and
Jimeno (2016) provide empirical evidence on the
impact of labour market institutions on labour mar-
ket performance, especially the connection between
labour market institutions and the equilibrium or
natural rate of unemployment. Important studies
that relate unemployment to labour market institu-
tions but not to the output gap are Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000), Belot and van Ours (2001), Belot and
van Ours (2004) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel
(2005). Holmlund (2014) provides a recent discussion
on the relevance of various labour market institutions
and van Ours (2015) estimates a ‘difference version’
of the Okun relationship linking changes in unem-
ployment to labour market institutions.
Previous studies relating the unemployment gap
(or the unemployment rate) to the output gap and to
labour market institutions mostly look at a subset of
OECD countries. All of the studies we have exam-
ined find that the unemployment rate is negatively
related to the output gap. The findings on the rela-
tionship between unemployment rates and labour
market institutions vary. It is common for studies
to include the unemployment benefit replacement
rate and sometimes measures of the duration and
eligibility requirements.3 All of the studies we have
looked at find a positive relationship between the
unemployment rate and the replacement rate. Most
studies also include union density as an explanatory
variable. While Adams and Coe (1990), Coe (1990)
and Scarpetta (1996) find a positive relationship
between the unemployment rate and union density,
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) and
Bassanini and Duval (2009) do not find any statisti-
cally significant relationship between the two.
3Bassanini and Duval (2009) and Vandenberg (2010), for example, include measures of the duration and eligibility requirements.
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Many researchers include a measure of employ-
ment protection as an explanatory variable. Again
there are mixed results. While Scarpetta (1996) and
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) find a posi-
tive relationship between the unemployment rate
and employment protection Griffith, Harrison and
Macartney (2007), Bassanini and Duval (2009) and
Vandenberg (2010) do not find any statistically sig-
nificant relationship between them.
The influence of wage coordination and/or centra-
lisation on the unemployment rate has also been
examined. While Vandenberg (2010) finds no evi-
dence of any impact of centralisation, others (e.g.
Scarpetta 1996; Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta
1998) conclude that there is a ‘hump-shaped’ relation-
ship between the unemployment rate and centralisa-
tion as suggested by Calmfors and Driffill (1988).
The most common additional explanatory vari-
ables included in studies are active labour market
programs (Scarpetta 1996; Elmeskov, Martin, and
Scarpetta 1998), the tax wedge and non-wage labour
costs (Adams, Fenton, and Larsen 1987; Coe 1990;
Scarpetta 1996; Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta
1998; Griffith, Harrison, and Macartney 2007;
Bassanini and Duval 2009), the real exchange rate
(Adams, Fenton, and Larsen 1987; Griffith,
Harrison, and Macartney 2007) and the terms of
trade (Scarpetta 1996). Other (less common) vari-
ables included are the minimum wage (Adams and
Coe 1990; Coe 1990; Elmeskov, Martin, and
Scarpetta 1998), the rate of structural change
(Herwartz and Niebuhr 2011), the level of product
market regulation (Bassanini and Duval 2009) and
demographic factors such as the proportion of the
labour force who are ‘young’ (Adams, Fenton, and
Larsen 1987; Adams and Coe 1990).
The studies noted cover different sample periods.
Ball, Leigh and Loungani (2013) studied the Okun
relationship for the United States from 1948 to 2011
and for 20 OECD countries from 1980 to 2011. They
concluded that there was a strong and stable rela-
tionship ‘by the standards of macroeconomics’ in
most countries, although the magnitude of the rela-
tionship between output and unemployment varied
across countries. Pereira (2013) analysed quarterly
US data from 1948:1 to 2012:4 and found that there
are asymmetries in the Okun relationship with a
weaker relationship between economic growth and
unemployment during periods of expansion.
Empirical model
Okun’s law is an empirical relationship between out-
put and unemployment which in its ‘gap’ version
may be written as
u uð Þ ¼ Φ y yð Þ (1)
where u is the unemployment rate; y is (log) output;
y is (log) potential output, u indicates the equili-
brium unemployment rate and Φ is the Okun
coefficient.
Our baseline econometric model, for a panel data-
set across countries and time periods, is
uit ¼ αi Φ yit  yit
 þ εit (2)
E εitεjt
  ¼ σij
E εisεitð Þ ¼ 0; st
The subscript i denotes the country and t is time in
years. αi Are the country-specific fixed effects (which,
in this model, are equal to ui the country-specific
equilibrium unemployment rates). It is assumed that
the errors are related cross-sectionally (i.e. across
countries), but not across periods (i.e. years). The
model is estimated by generalised least squares allow-
ing for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity.
As is common in the literature, the output gap is
estimated using the Hodrick–Prescott filter.
Specifically, the HP filter is a two-sided linear filter
that computes the smoothed series y of y by mini-
mising the variance of y around y subject to a
penalty function that constrains the change in the
trend growth of y:
Θ ¼
XT
t¼1
yt  yt
 2
þ λ
XT1
t¼2
ytþ1  yt
  yt  yt1
  2
(3)
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness
of the series and the suggested value by HP is 100.4
4Ravn and Uhlig (2002) suggest 6.25 for annual data. The results using this value of λ are essentially the same as those reported using λ ¼ 100: As an
alternative to the HP filter, we used a Band-pass filter and a Beveridge–Nelson decomposition but neither led to any change in our main findings.
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Data
Because of data availability, the focus of the analysis
is on 20 OECD countries over the period 1985–2013.
There are 5 countries outside Europe (Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United states)
and 15 countries in Europe of which 10 adopted the
Euro (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and
5 did not (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom).
Output gaps are created for each country in the data
set. By construction, the mean value of each country’s
output gap is zero. Figure 1 provides information
about the evolution over time of the unemployment
rates and the (inverse of the) output gap for the 20
countries in our sample. The vertical scales show the
difference in the fluctuations in unemployment rate
and/or output gap across the panel. Clearly, in all
countries, variations in unemployment rates and out-
put gaps go hand in hand. The output gap is associated
with the Great Recession, which (because of the inverse
scale is presented as a strong increase) has had a greater
impact on some countries than on others. In Australia,
for example, the increase in unemployment is relatively
small while for Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United
States, for example, the increase was relatively large.
While unemployment in Germany and the United
States fell after the Great Recession, in other countries
such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain unemploy-
ment continued to be high.
Figure 1. Unemployment rates and output gaps (inverse); 1985–2013.
The solid lines are the actual unemployment rates (LHS) and the dashed lines are the (inverse) output gaps (RHS).
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Parameter estimates
Table 1 shows the parameter estimates of the base-
line version of the Okun relationship, i.e. the estima-
tion of Equation (2) above which assumes that the
equilibrium rate of unemployment (u*) varies across
countries but, for each country, it is constant over
time. The GDP-gap has a significant and negative
effect on the unemployment rate. This is not surpris-
ing given the high correlation between the two as
shown in Figure 1.
Table 1 also shows that there is considerable
cross-country variation in the implied equilibrium
unemployment rates, with estimates of α ranging
from a low of 3% in Switzerland to a high of 17%
for Spain. There is strong cross-country correlation
between the average unemployment rate and the
estimated values of the equilibrium unemployment
rate.
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates when we
modify Equation (2) to allow for asymmetry, in the
sense that positive/negative output gaps have differ-
ent effects on unemployment. As shown in the sec-
ond column of Table 2, we are unable to reject the
hypothesis of symmetry. The third column shows
parameter estimates if we allow the effect of the
output gap on unemployment to be different after
the Great Recession from that before the Great
Recession. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
they are different for this simple model.
III. Introducing labour market institutions
Labour market institutions
So far, equilibrium unemployment rates have been
assumed to be constant over time. However, pre-
vious studies suggest that labour market institutions
may affect the equilibrium unemployment rate. We
investigate the significance of the following labour
market institutions: union coverage, union density,
wage coordination, UI replacement rate, employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) and the tax
wedge and additionally the terms of trade.
Furthermore, since labour markets have become
more flexible in the past decades we investigate
whether the responsiveness of unemployment to a
change in the output gap is influenced by the ratio of
temporary workers to total employees since the lar-
ger the share of temporary workers the easier (ceteris
paribus) the adjustment of employment to output
shocks and thus (ceteris paribus) the bigger the effect
of an output shock on unemployment.
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the
developments in the labour market institutions.
Appendix A provides details on the data used. Each
of the graphs in Figure 2 plots, for each country, the
values of the variables at two points in time – 1985
and 2013. Clearly, for many countries, not much has
happened between these 2 years as they are on the
diagonal or close to it. However, there are also some
exceptions. The graphs in panel a indicate the evolu-
tion in union coverage (left) and union density
(right). Union coverage is high in Austria, Belgium
and France and low in Japan and the United States.
If a country is below the diagonal, it indicates a drop
in union coverage or union density. The fall in union
coverage has been greatest in Australia, New
Zealand, Portugal and the United Kingdom. For
these countries, the fall in union density has been
substantial as well. Union density is high in the
Scandinavian countries (which has to do with UI
benefits run by unions) while union density is low
in France, the United States and Spain. Panel b
shows the evolution of wage coordination (left) and
UI replacement rate (right). There is quite a wide
Table 1. Okun relationship – 1985–2013.
u 7.50 (0.00)
GDP-gap 0.54 (0.00)
uj
Australia 6.89 (0.00) Japan 3.88 (0.00)
Austria 4.04 (0.00) Netherlands 5.89 (0.00)
Belgium 8.46 (0.00) New Zealand 6.21 (0.00)
Canada 8.33 (0.00) Norway 3.93 (0.00)
Denmark 6.47 (0.00) Portugal 7.71 (0.00)
Finland 8.90 (0.00) Spain 17.31 (0.00)
France 9.94 (0.00) Sweden 6.35 (0.00)
Germany 7.73 (0.00) Switzerland 3.06 (0.00)
Ireland 11.12 (0.00) United Kingdom 7.46 (0.00)
Italy 10.14 (0.00) United States 6.23 (0.00)
p-values in parentheses.
Table 2. Symmetry and stability of the Okun relationship.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
u* 7.50 (0.00) 7.34 (0.00) 7.53 (0.00)
GDP-gap 0.54 (0.00)
GDP-gap_pos 0.44 (0.00)
GDP-gap_neg 0.64 (0.00)
GDP-gap_pre GR 0.58 (0.00)
GDP-gap_post GR 0.37 (0.00)
Wald test
No asymmetric effects 2.36 (0.12)
No difference pre-post GR 4.16 (0.04)
All estimates contain country fixed effects; the estimates in the first column
are identical to the ones presented in Table; p-values in parentheses.
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range of wage coordination with Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States having the lowest
value of the indicator. In Australia and New
Zealand, wage coordination has fallen while in
Italy, wage coordination has increased substantially.
With respect to the UI replacement rate in most
countries, there was a decrease over our sample
period but for Italy, Portugal and Norway, there
was a substantial increase. Panel c shows the
developments in the tax wedge (left) and EPL
(right). In many countries, the tax wedge did not
change a lot but in Ireland, there was a substantial
drop while in Japan, there was a substantial increase.
Finally, as shown in the bottom-right graph, in many
countries, EPL shows persistence over time but there
are also countries for which EPL was reduced a lot
(Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden).
Figure 2. Labour market characteristics 1985 and 2013. (a) Union coverage (left) and union density (right). (b) Wage coordination
(left) and UI replacement rate (right). (C) Tax wedge (left) and employment protection legislation (right).
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Okun relationship with labour market institutions
To take the effect of labour market institutions into
account, we estimate the Okun relationship in the
following form:
uit ¼ αi þ βzit  Φ0 þΦ1qitð Þ yit  yit
 þ εit (4)
where z represents a vector of labour market institu-
tions and q is the share of temporary workers in
employment. Thus, the time-varying equilibrium
rates of unemployment are modelled as
uit ¼ αi þ βzit. By introducing the share of tempor-
ary workers as a possible determinant of the magni-
tude of the Okun coefficient, we allow for the
possibility that in more flexible labour markets,
there is a stronger unemployment response to a
change in the output gap.5
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation
(4) under two different assumptions about the varia-
bility of the Okun coefficient (Φ). Column (1) shows
the results when imposing the restriction that there
is no variation in the Okun coefficient across time
and without allowing for it to interact with the share
of temporary workers (i.e. Φ1 is set equal to zero).
Column (2) shows the parameter estimates if we
allow the Okun coefficient to have different values
before and after the Great Recession having removed
labour market institutions which do not have a sig-
nificant effect on the unemployment rates.
Column (3) shows the results when we allow for
the Okun coefficient (Φ0) to be different pre– and
post–the Great Recession and the Okun coefficient is
allowed to interact with the share of temporary
workers (qit). Thus, the effect of a unit change in
the size of the output gap upon the unemployment
rate is allowed to vary across countries and across
time (as the share of temporary workers varies across
countries and across time).6 Column (4) of Table 3
shows the results of Equation (4) on the assumption
that the Okun coefficient (Φ0) is the same pre– and
post–the Great Recession (consistent with the find-
ings reported in column (3)).
Inspection of the estimated values of the coeffi-
cients and their p-values in the top part of the table
(the part which reports coefficients on the output
gaps) and also the result of a Wald test for a sig-
nificant difference between the value of the Okun
coefficient before and after the Great Recession (this
is reported at the bottom of the Table) leads us to
conclude that (a) for the base model, we reject the
hypothesis that the Okun coefficient has remained
the same over time. (b) Once we introduce labour
market institutions and allow the size of the Okun
coefficient to vary with the share of temporary work-
ers, the magnitude of the Okun coefficient pre– and
post–the Great Recession is virtually identical. This
suggests that the apparent change in the Okun coef-
ficient after the Great Recession noted earlier when
Table 3. Parameter estimates – including labour market institutions.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP-gap 0.48 (0.00) 0.47 (0.00) 0.47 (0.00)
GDP-gap_pre GR 0.46 (0.00) 0.47 (0.00)
GDP-gap_post GR 0.53 (0.00) 0.48 (0.00)
GDP-gap*share temp 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Union coverage 0.01 (0.33)
Union density 0.05 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Wage coordination −0.76 (0.00) −0.68 (0.00) −0.65 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00) −0.90 (0.00)
UI replacement rate 0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Employment protection −0.01 (0.97)
Tax wedge 0.13 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.22 (0.00)
Terms of trade −0.06 (0.00) −0.06 (0.00) −0.06 (0.00) −0.06 (0.00) −0.04 (0.04)
Constant 7.50 (0.00) 7.50 (0.00) 7.51 (0.00) 7.51 (0.00) 7.91 (0.00)
Columns (1)–(4): 20 OECD countries; column (5): 15 European countries; all estimates contain country fixed effects; p-values in parentheses. Column (2): the
Wald test that pre–post Okun coefficients are not statistically different from each other: 0.561 (0.454).
5In many countries, the share of temporary workers in employment has increased substantially in the past decades. This is related to reforms of employment
protection legislation which are predominantly on the use of temporary contracts and not so much on the employment protection of regular workers
(Boeri and Van Ours 2013). In Spain, for example, the share of temporary workers increased a lot when temporary workers were allowed to perform regular
activities (Dolado, Garcia-Serrano, and Jimeno 2002). Faccini (2014) argues that temporary contracts became more popular as a screening device, whereas
Segal and Sullivan (1997) indicate that the use of temporary workers offers firms a greater flexibility in case of volatile demand. It is this greater flexibility
that we capture by including the share of temporary workers as a determinant of the Okun coefficient.
6We think that compared with non-temporary workers, a higher proportion of temporary workers are likely to move between employment and not in the
labour force (or ‘inactive’) relative to the proportion who move between employment and unemployment. As a result, the effect of a change in the output
gap (and thus the number of temporary workers employed) may impact more on the labour force participation rate than on the unemployment rate.
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discussing Table 2 may be due to the omission of
labour market institutions. (c) The sign of the coef-
ficient on the interaction term implies that the larger
is the share of temporary workers, the ‘larger’ (i.e.
the more negative) is the impact of a change in the
output gap on the unemployment gap.7 Since the
share of temporary workers has been rising on aver-
age and across all age groups, this implies that the
Okun coefficient, i.e. the impact of a change in the
output gap on the unemployment gap, has likely
been trending upwards (becoming more negative)
over time. Note that similar conclusions were
reached in an IMF study of Okun’s Law. ‘The
responsiveness of unemployment to output has
increased over the past 20 years in many countries.
This reflects (inter alia) the greater use of temporary
employment contracts’ (International Monetary
Fund (2010), Ch 3, 1).
We turn now to the effect of labour market vari-
ables in explaining differences in the unemployment
rate across countries and over time. The signs and
significance of most of these variables are robust
across the different specifications. The results given
in column (1) in the lower part of Table 3 show that
there is no significant relationship between the
(equilibrium) unemployment rate and union cover-
age (defined as the proportion of workers covered by
collective bargaining) but we find a significant and,
as expected, positive relationship between the unem-
ployment rate and union density (defined as the
proportion of workers who are union members).
Furthermore, wage coordination has a significant
negative effect on unemployment while the UI repla-
cement rate has a significant positive effect. EPL has
no significant effect on unemployment. The tax
wedge has a significant positive effect8 and terms of
trade has a significant negative effect on unemploy-
ment. We removed union coverage and EPL from
the analysis.9
As a check of robustness, we also estimated the
model for different groups of countries. Column (5)
of Table 3 shows the parameter estimates if we
restrict the sample to 15 European countries. Not
reported are estimates for the 13 European Union
countries and for the 10 Eurozone countries. The
results are robust across these different combina-
tions of European countries.
Equilibrium unemployment rates
Figure 3 plots the observed and our estimated equi-
librium unemployment rates over the sample period
1985–2013. The equilibrium rates have been gener-
ated from Equation (4), where the relevant coeffi-
cients are those reported in the fourth column of
Table 3.10
What is noteworthy about these figures is the
different behaviour of the equilibrium rate over
time. For some countries (Belgium, Finland,
France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden), their equili-
brium rates were roughly constant over the period as
the labour market institutions hardly changed. For
others (Austria, Japan, Norway and Switzerland),
their equilibrium rates of unemployment were rising
over the period, albeit at markedly different rates
(compare Japan with Switzerland for example).
While for a larger group of countries (Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States) with improved labour market institutions,
their equilibrium rates were falling over the period,
albeit again at markedly different speeds (compare
the United Kingdom with the Netherlands for
example).
What is particularly interesting about this is that for
the ten countries in our sample who are in the
Eurozone (and thus have fixed exchange rates vis-a-
vis each other) – namely Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain – five (Belgium, Finland, France,
Portugal and Spain) experienced roughly constant
equilibrium rates, one (Austria) experienced a rising
equilibrium rate and four (Germany, Ireland, Italy and
the Netherlands) experienced falling equilibrium rates.
7In order to allow for the possible effect of endogeneity in the share of temporary workers, we also estimated the model described in column (3) (our
preferred model) using the lagged value of the temporary share variable as well as using the predicted temporary share variable (with lags of the other
variables as instruments). The results are robust.
8Note that Lehmann et al. (2014) find that for a given overall level of labour income taxation, a more progressive tax schedule reduces the unemployment
rate.
9To investigate the nature of the country fixed effects, we also used the Mundlak (1978) approach. The results confirm that time variation in equilibrium
unemployment rates can be attributed to changes in labour market institutions, but that persistent cross-country differences cannot be explained solely by
differences in labour market institutions.
10As noted above, the signs and size of the labour market coefficients do not vary markedly under different specifications of the model.
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Given the model of unemployment used to gen-
erate the equilibrium rates of unemployment in this
article, the explanation for the different trends in
the equilibrium rate reflects different trends in
labour market institutions. We make two observa-
tions here about the equilibrium rates of unemploy-
ment. To the extent, for example, that different
trends in the equilibrium rate reflect different
trends at the national levels in the amount of fric-
tional unemployment – where frictional unemploy-
ment in this context is defined as a situation where
the characteristics of an unemployed worker in one
EU country are matched by the characteristics of a
vacancy in that or another EU country – then
facilitating labour mobility would seem to be the
desirable and effective policy response. To the
extent that low mobility is a reflection of current
labour market institutions, a change in the institu-
tions in a way that would enhance mobility will lead
to convergence in the equilibrium rates. Another
example would be differences in the equilibrium
rate resulting from differences in the UI replace-
ment rate, differences which effectively ensures dif-
ferences in the minimum reservation wage. Here,
again a harmonisation of labour market institutions
– and specifically in this case social protection
objectives and policies – would lead to convergence
in the equilibrium rates.
Figure 3. Actual unemployment rates and equilibrium unemployment rates; 1985–2013.
The solid lines are the actual unemployment rates and the dashed lines are the equilibrium unemployment rates computed using
the estimates in column (4) of Table 3.
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Sensitivity analysis
To explore the robustness of our findings, we per-
formed additional sensitivity analyses. First, we
added a common global factor into the Okun
model. As discussed in more detail in Appendix
B1, this hardly influences our parameter estimates.
Second, we introduced product market regulation as
an additional explanatory variable. Although pro-
duct market regulation has a significant positive
effect on unemployment rates, it has not been
retained. This is because product market regulation
and union density are highly correlated and it is not
clear what product market regulation is picking up
(see for details Appendix B2). Furthermore, because
of the reunification of Germany, we estimated a
model allowing for a shift in the German data at
that time. This did not lead to any essential differ-
ence in our results. Finally, because changes in the
collection of the European labour force survey might
have introduced breaks in the unemployment series
in 2003, data for 2003 were dropped from our sam-
ple period as a robustness check. This did not lead to
any change in our main findings.
IV. Okun’s relationship by age and gender
Unemployment rates by age and gender
There are large and persistent differences in the
labour market characteristics of workers according
to their age and gender. Table 4 provides an over-
view of country-specific averages of the unemploy-
ment rates by age and gender. Clearly, there are
substantial differences both within and between
countries. Youth unemployment rates are on aver-
age twice as high as unemployment rates among
prime age workers, whereas unemployment rates
among old men and women are on average the
lowest. There are differences between unemploy-
ment rates of young men and young women but
the dominant difference amongst the young is
according to country, not gender. Whereas on
average, youth unemployment rates in Austria,
Germany, Japan and Switzerland are below 10%,
they are above 25% for young men and women in
Italy and Spain. There are also differences for
prime age workers but they are substantially
smaller in absolute terms. The lowest unemploy-
ment rates over the time period for prime age men
and women are in Norway and Japan (below 4%).
The highest unemployment rates for old men are
in Spain with 10.2% and for old women in
Germany with almost 11%, while the lowest rates
for old men and women are in Norway (both less
than 2%).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of unemployment
rates over the period 1985–2013 averaged for the 20
countries and disaggregated by age and gender. The
unemployment rates shown in panel a are very dif-
ferent depending on age. The unemployment rates
of young individuals are by far the highest and they
fluctuate much more than the unemployment rates
of prime age and old individuals. Conditional on
age, the differences between men and women are
small.
Modified Okun relationship
It is well known and has been illustrated in the
previous subsection that unemployment rates of
young workers are on average higher and more
volatile than unemployment rates of prime age and
old workers (Bell and Blanchflower 2011). There are
Table 4. Country-specific unemployment rates by age and
gender; average 1985–2013 (%).
Women Men
15–24 25–54 55–64 15–24 25–54 55–64
Australia 12.7 5.5 3.4 14.0 5.3 6.3
Austria 7.6 4.1 3.1 7.3 3.5 4.2
Belgium 21.7 9.6 5.0 17.5 5.9 4.1
Canada 12.3 7.1 6.5 15.6 7.3 7.1
Denmark 10.4 6.5 6.0 9.9 5.1 5.2
Finland 18.6 7.0 8.6 18.7 7.5 9.2
France 24.6 10.2 6.7 21.0 7.3 6.7
Germany 8.5 7.8 10.8 9.3 6.7 9.5
Ireland 16.5 9.2 5.7 20.5 10.5 6.9
Italy 34.9 11.0 3.3 25.9 5.7 3.6
Japan 6.5 3.6 2.6 7.7 3.1 5.1
Netherlands 10.4 6.2 3.8 9.6 4.3 3.6
New Zealand 13.0 4.9 3.1 13.8 4.8 3.9
Norway 9.7 2.9 1.3 10.4 3.3 1.9
Portugal 19.3 7.6 4.1 14.2 5.4 5.5
Spain 39.2 19.5 10.0 29.7 12.2 10.2
Sweden 15.2 4.8 4.1 16.5 5.3 5.3
Switzerland 6.5 4.0 2.7 6.7 2.7 3.0
United Kingdom 12.4 5.5 3.8 16.6 6.5 7.2
United States 11.7 5.1 3.7 13.6 5.1 4.3
Average 15.8 7.2 5.0 15.1 5.9 5.7
Note that the data for Austria refer to the period from 1994 onwards, for
New Zealand from 1986 onwards and for Switzerland from 1991
onwards.
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various reasons why Okun’s relationship may be
age-specific.11 Compared to older workers, young
workers have less company-specific skills and less
dismissal protection (Dunsch 2015; O’Higgins
1997). Furthermore, to the extent that age is related
to experience, Becker (1964) argues that the amount
of specific training affects the incentives of firms and
workers to separate – an idea developed by Cairo
and Cajner (2014). Since the labour market position
of females is different from the labour market posi-
tion of males, it is likely that Okun’s relationship is
both age and gender-specific.
We begin by modifying our baseline model (2) to
allow estimation of the unemployment rates by age
and gender for six groups:
uikt ¼ αik Φk yit  yit
 þ εikt (5)
where k represents three age groups (15–24, 25–54,
55–64) for both males and females (k = 1,. . .,6). We
assume that the equilibrium rates not only differ
across countries, they also differ across age groups.
Parameter estimates
The parameter estimates of Equation (5) are pre-
sented in Table 5. There are clear differences in the
Okun relationship by age and gender. To start with,
the effect of the GDP-gap on the unemployment rate
decreases with age. Whereas the Okun coefficient
has a value of 1.14 for young males, it has a value
of 0.56 for prime age males and a value of 0.45 for
old males. A similar pattern though at smaller mag-
nitudes is present for females. When output changes,
the effect on unemployment rates is more than twice
as large for young workers than it is for older work-
ers. This explains Figure 4 which shows that, while
fluctuations in unemployment rates are highly cor-
related across age and gender, they are substantially
larger for young workers.
Figure 5 shows the cross-country relationship
between the estimated equilibrium unemployment
rates for young and prime age workers, separately
for males and females. Panel a shows the relation-
ship for males. There is across countries a strong
correlation between the unemployment rates of
young and prime age males. The ratio of the two
unemployment rates is about 2.5. Clear outliers are
Italy with a relatively high male youth unemploy-
ment rate and Germany with a relative low male
youth unemployment rate. Panel b shows the same
relationship for females. In many countries, the
female equilibrium unemployment rates are substan-
tially higher for both prime age and young females.
Across countries, Italy and Germany are likewise
outliers, as for males.
Finally, we allow labour institutions to affect the
separate Okun relationships by age and gender
(thereby allowing the equilibrium rates and the effect
Figure 4. Unemployment rates and shares of temporary workers by age and gender – averaged over 20 countries; 1985–2013. (a)
Unemployment rates. (b) Shares of temporary workers.
11There are three studies that have investigated age-specific versions of the difference form of Okun’s law. Hutengs and Stadtmann (2013) estimated Okun’s
relationship over the period 1984–2011 for 11 Eurozone countries and 5 age groups. Zanin (2014) studied 5 age cohorts by gender for 33 OECD countries
over the period 1998–2012. Hutengs and Stadtmann (2014) estimated Okun’s relationship for five Scandinavian countries and five age groups over the
period 1984–2011. All studies found that the change in unemployment is more sensitive to economic growth for young workers than for prime age and
older workers.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 11
of the output gap on the unemployment rate to be
time-varying); for k = 1,. . .,6
uikt ¼ αik þ βkzit
 
 Φ0 þΦkqiktð Þ yit  yit
 þ εikt (6)
where z represents labour market institutions, q is
the share of temporary workers and k represents 3
age groups (15–24, 25–54, 55–64) for both males and
females. As shown in panel b of Figure 4, the share
of temporary workers is substantially higher among
young workers and also increasing much faster than
among prime age and older workers. The increase in
the share of temporary workers over the sample
period is on average about 10 percentage-point
higher from 25% to 35%.
Table 6 shows the relevant parameter estimates
of Equation (6). Clearly, the estimated gap-coeffi-
cients are not very different from those in Table 5.
The share of temporary workers has a significant
effect on the gap-coefficient except for older work-
ers. This may be due to the low share of old
temporary workers as well as with the relative
stability of that share. The parameter estimate for
the interaction term between the output gap and
their share of temporary workers is smaller for
young workers but one has to take into account
the fact that the share of temporary workers is
Figure 5. Equilibrium unemployment rates by country and age and by gender; 1985–2013. (a) Males. (b) Females.
Based on parameter estimates from Table 5.
Table 5. Okun’s relationship by age and gender; 1985–2013.
15–24 25–54 55–64
Males Females Males Females Males Females
GDP-gap 1.14 (0.00) 0.76 (0.00) 0.56 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00) 0.45 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00)
u*
Australia 13.97 (0.00) 12.74 (0.00) 5.28 (0.00) 5.47 (0.00) 6.29 (0.00) 3.41 (0.00)
Austria 7.18 (0.00) 7.52 (0.00) 3.46 (0.00) 4.03 (0.00) 4.19 (0.00) 3.04 (0.00)
Belgium 17.48 (0.00) 21.68 (0.00) 5.93 (0.00) 9.56 (0.00) 4.11 (0.00) 4.96 (0.00)
Canada 15.61 (0.00) 12.26 (0.00) 7.26 (0.00) 7.08 (0.00) 7.13 (0.00) 6.48 (0.00)
Denmark 9.90 (0.00) 10.37 (0.00) 5.12 (0.00) 6.46 (0.00) 5.21 (0.00) 6.03 (0.00)
Finland 18.66 (0.00) 18.56 (0.00) 7.50 (0.00) 6.97 (0.00) 9.23 (0.00) 8.61 (0.00)
France 20.99 (0.00) 24.59 (0.00) 7.29 (0.00) 10.18 (0.00) 6.67 (0.00) 6.71 (0.00)
Germany 9.35 (0.00) 8.53 (0.00) 6.70 (0.00) 7.81 (0.00) 9.52 (0.00) 10.80 (0.00)
Ireland 20.49 (0.00) 16.48 (0.00) 10.48 (0.00) 9.22 (0.00) 6.94 (0.00) 5.66 (0.00)
Italy 25.89 (0.00) 34.86 (0.00) 5.71 (0.00) 11.05 (0.00) 3.55 (0.00) 3.35 (0.00)
Japan 7.70 (0.00) 6.48 (0.00) 3.13 (0.00) 3.57 (0.00) 5.06 (0.00) 2.56 (0.00)
Netherlands 9.65 (0.00) 10.35 (0.00) 4.33 (0.00) 6.19 (0.00) 3.58 (0.00) 3.83 (0.00)
New Zealand 13.79 (0.00) 12.96 (0.00) 4.74 (0.00) 4.90 (0.00) 3.92 (0.00) 3.09 (0.00)
Norway 10.37 (0.00) 9.66 (0.00) 3.27 (0.00) 2.91 (0.00) 1.94 (0.00) 1.29 (0.00)
Portugal 14.18 (0.00) 19.29 (0.00) 5.41 (0.00) 7.65 (0.00) 5.51 (0.00) 4.13 (0.00)
Spain 29.66 (0.00) 39.21 (0.00) 12.16 (0.00) 19.53 (0.00) 10.19 (0.00) 10.03 (0.00)
Sweden 16.54 (0.00) 15.15 (0.00) 5.27 (0.00) 4.77 (0.00) 5.35 (0.00) 4.14 (0.00)
Switzerland 6.57 (0.00) 6.38 (0.00) 2.64 (0.00) 3.93 (0.00) 2.92 (0.00) 2.67 (0.00)
United Kingdom 16.58 (0.00) 12.43 (0.00) 6.48 (0.00) 5.53 (0.00) 7.20 (0.00) 3.77 (0.00)
United States 13.58 (0.00) 11.70 (0.00) 5.12 (0.00) 5.07 (0.00) 4.29 (0.00) 3.71 (0.00)
p-values in parentheses.
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much higher and increasing. Finally, the magnitude
of the effects of labour market institutions on the
unemployment rates is age and gender specific. In
particular, a high level of wage coordination seems
to be mostly beneficial for young workers. A pos-
sible explanation is that a high level of wage coor-
dination more strongly internalizes the
unemployment effects of wage negotiations, espe-
cially youngsters suffer high unemployment rates.
Therefore, they may be more affected by a high
level of wage negotiations, i.e. for them, the dam-
pening effect on unemployment rates is strongest.
Nevertheless, the overall results are not very differ-
ent from those presented in Table 3.
As a final sensitivity analysis we included in the
estimates for old workers, the average age of retire-
ment. While the variable is significantly different
from zero, the other parameter estimates were
hardly affected (see Appendix B3 for details).
V. Conclusions
Okun’s empirical relationship has been shown
repeatedly, in a large number of studies to be an
enduring stylised fact. In this article, we revisit the
Okun relationship using a hybrid specification,
namely we relate the unemployment rate, on the
one hand, to the (determinants of the) equilibrium
unemployment rate and the output gap, on the
other.
The computation of the output gap follows stan-
dard practice in the literature, namely the output gap
is the difference between the actual (log) GDP less
the trend (log) output (estimated using the Hodrick–
Prescott filter). However, we augment the estimating
equation to allow labour market institutional factors
to affect the equilibrium rate of unemployment and
moreover, we also allow the share of temporary
workers to affect the relationship between the output
gap and the unemployment rate. These features
improved the analysis first, because the introduction
of institutional labour factors which changed over
time allowed the derivation of time-varying equili-
brium unemployment rates and second, the intro-
duction of a term to capture flexibility in the labour
market (the share of temporary workers) was parti-
cularly important as it captured effectively changes
in the Okun coefficient over time and allows us to
avoid the need to arbitrarily impose different coeffi-
cients pre– and post–the Great Recession.
Introducing an interaction between the share of
temporary workers and the output gap is also rele-
vant from an economic point of view. Labour mar-
kets have become more flexible in the past decades
and especially among young workers, the share of
temporary workers is not only high but also increas-
ing fast. In terms of the Okun relationship, this
means that the unemployment effects of shocks to
output have increased over time.
The empirical analysis was conducted using a
panel dataset covering 20 OECD countries over the
sample period 1985–2013. Although the observa-
tions were diverse over space and time, they are all
indicative of economic behaviour in advanced
economies linked by significant trade and financial
flows. The study focused on drawing broad infer-
ences, but we have also drawn attention to country-
specific differences. We find that the equilibrium
unemployment rate is (as expected) positively
related to union density, the replacement rate and
the tax wedge and is (again as expected) negatively
related to the level of the wage coordination and the
terms of trade.
Finally, since the unemployment rates for younger
workers (aged between 15 and 24 years) were consider-
ably higher than unemployment rates of both prime age
Table 6. Parameter estimates, effect institutions by age and gender.
Males Females
15–24 25–54 55–64 15–24 25–54 55–64
GDP-gap 1.05 (0.00) 0.52 (0.00) 0.45 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00) 0.29 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00)
GDP-gap*share temp 0.03 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.03 (0.28) 0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) −0.01 (0.52)
Union density −0.04 (0.14) 0.04 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.01 (0.83) 0.08 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Wage coordination −0.91 (0.00) −0.45 (0.00) −0.38 (0.00) −0.83 (0.00) −0.52 (0.00) −0.30 (0.00)
UI replacement rate 0.03 (0.29) 0.09 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) −0.04 (0.14) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.00)
Tax wedge 0.05 (0.25) 0.09 (0.00) 0.03 (0.08) 0.12 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00)
Terms of trade −0.10 (0.00) −0.07 (0.00) −0.05 (0.00) −0.05 (0.02) −0.03 (0.00) −0.03 (0.00)
Constant 15.07 (0.00) 5.92 (0.00) 5.69 (0.00) 15.77 (0.00) 7.19 (0.00) 4.96 (0.00)
All estimates contain country fixed effects; p-values in parentheses.
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and older workers, we also estimated Okun’s relation-
ship using unemployment rates disaggregated by age
and gender. The results provide statistically significant
empirical evidence that the effect of changes in the out-
put gap on the unemployment rate decreases with age.
In particular, that a positive change in the output gap is
likely to result in a greater reduction in unemployment
among younger job-seekers compared to the other age
groups. From a policy perspective, it follows that an
increase in economic growth (to close the output gap)
will not only have the desired outcome of reducing the
unemployment rate but it will also have the distribu-
tional effect of lowering youth unemployment.
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Appendix A. Details on data
(1) Unemployment and employment data:
Unemployment national averages for 20 countries.
Sources: (1) 1985–2003: Bassanini and Duval (2006),
(2) 2004–2013: OECD labour force statistics.
Unemployment rates and employment rates by gen-
der and age. Source: OECD labour force statistics.
(2) GDP. Source: World Bank.
(3) Unions and wage bargaining: Visser (2011) published
a database for the period 1960–2010 on institutional
characteristics of trade unions, wage setting, state
intervention and social pacts. In case of missing obser-
vations in recent years, numbers are assumed to be
constant from the last available year onwards. From
this database, the following series are used: (1) Union
density: union membership as a percentage of wage
and salary earners in employment. (2) Union coverage:
APPLIED ECONOMICS 15
employees in workplaces covered by unions or works
councils as a percentage of all wage and salary earners
in employment, adjusted for the possibility that some
sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to
bargain. (3) Coordination of wage bargaining: discrete
values ranging from 5 (economy-wide bargaining) to 1
(fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level).
(4) UI replacement rate: unemployment insurance and
unemployment assistance benefits as a percentage of
the Average Production Worker wage; this OECD
summary measure is defined as the average of the
gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for
two earnings levels, three family situations and three
durations of unemployment. Series 1985–2005 avail-
able for odd years – even years are calculated as aver-
age of adjacent odd years; from 2006 onwards,
unemployment insurance and unemployment assis-
tance benefits as a percentage of the Average Worker
wage; the jump in series from 2005 to 2006 has been
accounted for by the authors. Source: OECD statistics.
(5) Tax wedge: One-earner married couple at 100% of
average earnings with two children expressed as a
percentage of labour costs. Source: OECD Taxing
Wages – Comparative tables, Average TaxWedge (%).
(6) Employment protection legislation; scale 0–6, low–
high. Series available from 1985. Source: OECD
(2013).
(7) Average retirement age: OECD average effective age
of retirement calculated as a weighted average of
(net) withdrawals from the labour market at differ-
ent ages over a 5-year period for workers initially
aged 40 and over. Source: OECD labour force
statistics.
(8) Terms of trade: Calculated as the ratio of the
Deflators for Exports and Imports. Source: OECD
Economic Outlook – Country Tables Annual Data,
Deflators and CPI.
(9) Share of temporary workers, average and by gender
and age. Source: OECD labour force statistics.
(10) Product market regulation: Summary indicator of
regulatory impediments to product market competi-
tion in seven non-manufacturing industries. Source:
OECD Regulatory Base.
Table A1 provides information about averages of unem-
ployment rates (%) and annual GDP-growth rates (%) over
the period 1985–2013. Averaged over the 20 countries, the
unemployment rate was 7.5% and the annual GDP-growth
rate was 2.3%.
Table A2 presents correlations between labour market
institutions. To remove cross-sectional correlation, all series
are transformed to differences from country-averages.
Clearly, the correlations between union coverage and union
density, between product market regulation and union den-
sity and between product market regulation and employment
protection legislation are quite high.
Appendix B. Sensitivity analysis
B1: Adding a common factor
As a further check on the robustness of our results, we also
introduced an additional common factor into the Okun model:
uit ¼ αi þ βxit þ ϕ yit  yit
 þ κFt þ eit (7)
with κ as additional parameter and Ft ¼ Ft1 þ νt . That is
the equilibrium unemployment rates are driven by labour
market institutions and a common (global) latent variable.
Preliminary factor analysis using a principle components
approach showed that the first principle component accounts
for around 40% of the variation of unemployment rate in the
panel and it needs at least five factors to account for about
90% of the variations. The results with a common factor are
shown Table B1. This table compares the parameter esti-
mates of our baseline model where column (1) replicates
column (4) of Table 3 while column (2) present the para-
meter estimates of the common factor approach.
From a comparison of the parameter estimates in both
columns, it is clear that some of the parameter estimates are
affected but with the exception of union density the para-
meter estimates are not quantitatively different from each
other. It would seem that the common factor is mainly
picking up the effect of union density. Since our aim is to
be explicit about labour market institutions, we have opted to
concentrate on the model with the union density variable
rather than the one with the common (global) factor.
Table A2. Correlations between labour market institutions
1985–2013.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. Union coverage –
2. Union density 0.73 –
3. Wage
coordination
0.31 0.29 –
4. UI replacement
rate
0.05 −0.10 0.08 –
5. Tax wedge 0.46 0.45 −0.06 −0.16 –
6. Terms of trade −0.01 0.02 −0.03 −0.04 0.00 –
7. EPL 0.02 0.21 −0.02 −0.38 0.11 0.15 –
8. PMR 0.39 0.67 0.14 −0.23 0.33 0.11 0.63 –
Table A1. Unemployment and GDP growth; averages
1985–2013.
u Growth u Growth
Australia 6.9 3.4 Japan 3.9 1.8
Austria 4.0 2.2 Netherlands 5.9 2.2
Belgium 8.5 1.9 New Zealand 6.2 2.4
Canada 8.3 2.5 Norway 3.9 2.4
Denmark 6.5 1.5 Portugal 7.7 2.1
Finland 9.0 2.1 Spain 17.3 2.4
France 9.9 1.8 Sweden 6.4 2.2
Germany 7.7 1.8 Switzerland 3.1 1.8
Ireland 11.1 4.4 United Kingdom 7.5 2.4
Italy 10.1 1.2 United States 6.2 2.7
Note that by construction, the average output-gap is 0 for every country.
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B2: Product market regulation
By way of sensitivity analysis, we introduced an indicator for
product market regulations as additional explanatory vari-
able (see also Appendix A). The results are shown in
Table B2.
Product market regulations have a significant positive
effect on the unemployment rate. However, now union den-
sity becomes insignificant. If we remove union density, the
effect of product market regulations remains significantly
positive. As shown in Table A2, product market regulation
and union density are highly correlated. This correlation could
arise because in many countries over time, PMR has been
reduced at the same time as union density also dropped. For
illustrative purposes, Table B3 shows estimates of the Okun
relationship by age and gender when we remove union density
as explanatory variable and introduce PMR instead.
Now, we find that that PMR has significant negative
effects on the unemployment rate of young and prime age
men. This is an odd result. Since these groups make up such
a large proportion of the total labour force, the finding that
PMR has significant negative effects on the unemployment
rate of young and prime age men strengthens the case against
including PMR in the ‘aggregate model’. We think that the
effect of PMR is actually picking up the effect of union
density going down.
B3: Retirement ages
As a final sensitivity analysis, we include the average age of
retirement in the Okun relationship for older workers. We
do not have the average age of retirement in the main
model because this variable is potentially endogenous.
After all, it could be that retirement age is reduced to
reduce unemployment rates of old workers. The parameter
estimates shown in Table B4 indicate that the average
retirement age has a significant positive effect on the unem-
ployment rate of older workers. This would imply that an
increase in retirement age increases unemployment rates of
old workers. Leaving aside the endogeneity issue, this sug-
gests that an increase in retirement age stops some workers
to make a transition to out of the labour force. Instead,
these workers become unemployed. However, the other
parameter estimates are hardly affected by the inclusion of
this variable.
Table B3. Estimates by age and gender with PMR.
Males Females
15–24 25–54 55–64 15–24 25–54 55–64
GDP-gap 1.07 (0.00) 0.52 (0.00) 0.46 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00) 0.30 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00)
GDP-gap*share temp 0.03 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.03 (0.19) 0.02 (0.02) 0.06 (0.00) −0.01 (0.48)
Wage coordination −0.65 (0.00) −0.22 (0.01) −0.25 (0.01) −0.87 (0.00) −0.57 (0.00) −0.18 (0.01)
UI Replacement rate −0.01 (0.84) 0.07 (0.00) 0.06 (0.01) −0.03 (0.25) 0.07 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
Tax wedge 0.07 (0.12) 0.12 (0.00) 0.05 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01) 0.14 (0.00) 0.08 (0.01)
Terms of trade −0.10 (0.00) −0.07 (0.02) −0.05 (0.00) −0.05 (0.02) −0.04 (0.00) −0.03 (0.00)
PMR −0.71 (0.00) −0.11 (0.04) 0.07 (0.05) 0.22 (0.07) 0.63 (0.00) 0.08 (0.05)
Constant 15.06 (0.00) 5.91 (0.00) 5.68 (0.00) 15.78 (0.00) 7.20 (0.00) 4.96 (0.00)
p-values in parentheses.
Table B1. Adding a common factor.
Baseline Common factor
GDP-gap 0.47 (0.00) 0.41 (0.00)
GDP-gap*share temp 0.05 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00)
Union density 0.06 (0.00) 0.01 (0.36)
Wage coordination −0.65 (0.00) −0.70 (0.00)
UI Replacement rate 0.04 (0.01) 0.06 (0.04)
Tax wedge 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00)
Terms of trade −0.06 (0.00) −0.06 (0.01)
Common factor 0.46 (0.00)
Constant 7.51 (0.00) 7.51 (0.00)
p-values in parentheses.
Table B4. Additional estimates workers aged 55–64.
Males Females
GDP-gap 0.46 (0.00) 0.25 (0.00)
GDP-gap*share temp 0.02 (0.36) −0.02 (0.38)
Union density 0.05 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Wage coordination −0.41 (0.00) −0.31 (0.00)
UI Replacement rate 0.08 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00)
Tax wedge 0.05 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Terms of trade −0.05 (0.00) −0.03 (0.00)
Retirement age 0.17 (0.05) 0.10 (0.04)
Constant 5.70 (0.00) 4.96 (0.00)
p-values in parentheses.
Table B2. Introducing product market regulations.
Variable (1) (2)
GDP-gap 0.48 (0.00) 0.48 (0.00)
Union density 0.00 (0.95)
Wage coordination −0.63 (0.00) −0.63 (0.00)
UI replacement rate 0.06 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00)
Tax wedge 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00)
Terms of trade −0.07 (0.00) −0.07 (0.00)
PMR 0.36 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00)
Constant 7.50 (0.00) 7.50 (0.00)
p-values in parentheses.
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